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The way in which geometrical knowledge has been obtained has always at-
tracted the attention of philosophers. The fact that there is a science that
concerns things outside our thinking and that proceeds inferentially appeared
striking, and gave rise to specific theories of experience and space. Nonetheless,
the geometrical method has not yet been sufficiently investigated. Philosophers
who investigate the theory of knowledge discuss the question of whether ge-
ometry is an empirical science, but do not investigate in detail the technical
concepts used by geometers. Yet, this would be appropriate. Mathematicians
involved in the study of the foundations of geometry, and in particular of the
so-called non-Euclidean geometry, which has often been rejected from a philo-
sophical perspective, investigate what follows from certain assumptions. Even
if geometers are aware of the fact that they did not make those assumptions ar-
bitrarily, and that they could not make them completely arbitrarily, it is quite
natural for them not to worry about the sources from which those assumptions
flew out of. Geometers are only concerned with inferring consequences, and do
not pay attention to the different mental activities involved in the exercise of
this. A combination of different skills acting in unison would most likely solve
the problem posed for the theory of knowledge by the existence of geometry.
Surveying the concepts used by geometers, one might notice a fundamental
difference. Some concepts are defined by means of a construction, others are
basically taken as given. The concept of a square is never introduced without
a construction, no matter how well-known the figure is.1 You start from an
arbitrary side of the square, add at a right angle a second side that is equal
in length to the first, then a third, and finally you close the figure. In such a
∗ The translation is a work of joint authorship, but Paola Cantù mainly con-
tributed to the translation of the first half (up to page 23, endnote 42 included),
while Oliver Schlaudt mainly contributed to the second half of Hölder’s inaugural
lecture.
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construction one presupposes the notions of straight line, right angle, and equal
lengths. The concept of a straight line is not defined by this construction.2
The idea of a straight line appears thus as primary. Like the straight line,
the point is also a given concept in geometry. The definition given by Euclid,
i.e., that which has no parts, is not appropriate to give the idea of a point to
someone who does not know what it is; indeed, this definition is not used by
Euclid afterwards.3
Beside these concepts, which are available to the geometer as a given ma-
terial, some assertions of a more general kind (which hold or should hold for
these concepts) are also established from the beginning. These fundamental
facts, being presupposed without proof, are called axioms or postulates.4 For
example, one uses all the time the axiom that a straight line can be traced
between any two points and be thus fully determined.5
Where do the concepts that are taken for granted in geometry come from?
And where do the axioms come from? These were the first questions raised as
one began to investigate the theory of geometrical knowledge. Some answered:
“From the intuition of space”, others answered: “From experience”. As is well-
known, Kant saw the source of our geometrical knowledge in intuition. He
tried to explain that this knowledge is—as he said—necessary,6 by assuming
a “pure” intuition, independent from experience. To explain that the laws
of this pure intuition—that is proper to us—can be applied to the world of
phenomena, Kant claimed that this intuition of ours is the condition set by our
own nature for having a sensory experience of spatially extended objects. For
this reason, some inner laws impose themselves on the form of our perception.
So, according to Kant, intuition makes external experience possible and thus
can not be explained as deriving from experience.7
Unlike Kant, other authors considered the intuitive representations of spa-
tial objects that we come across in our imagination just as mnemonical rep-
resentations of visual and tactile sense perceptions. We can arrange these
representations in succession, and maybe also partially modify them, yet, they
derive from sense perception. Intuition is considered as the source of geomet-
rical knowledge but it appears here, conversely, as a result of experience.8
Geometry is immediately related to experience by those who consider ax-
ioms as the straightforward results of observations or measurements made on
physical bodies. Thus the primitive concepts are also explained in a more
physical way; for example, the straight line is for them the line of sight, or
the position taken by a thread in a state of tension. This view was defended
by outstanding natural scientists: it has recently been made prominent by
Helmholtz, but it had already been fostered by Newton.9 This same view has
been attacked fervidly by Kant’s followers, who considered it a vicious circle to
ground on experience facts that are contained in intuition, because they saw
intuition as a condition of external experience. If one wants to hold the above-
mentioned view without running into fallacies, one should at any rate limit
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oneself to the observations that are not themselves grounded in geometrical
considerations.10 One should use facts of immediate perception.
An example of an immediate perception of this kind could be that a suc-
cession of smaller objects might overlap from a given point of view, whereas
they do not overlap from another viewer’s standpoint, and that these objects
that overlap with respect to a given standpoint do not overlap partially from
any other viewpoint.11
From such perceptions one can draw12 the concept of the straight line and
also the fact that there is one and only one straight line through two points. I
have used here the facts related to the line of sight. We could also consider the
taut thread. We must assume that the visual images which characterize the
taut thread have a certain immediate13 similarity to one another, and differ
from those of a thread which is not taut. The simultaneous occurrence of those
first visual images with some tactile sensations, and with muscular sensations
provoked in us by the effort of making the thread taut, the experiences that
we have when we pluck the taut thread, or when we look along it, build
up a factual basis from which the concept of the straight line, and also the
mechanical concept of tension can be drawn. Since the repeated attempt to
stretch a thread always reaches the same position, experience teaches us that
between two points there can be one and only one straight line.
Another concept that should be explained in a similar way is the concept
of equality of line segments and angles. Whether two line segments are equal
in size can be empirically tested by repeated application of a mathematical
compass or a ruler. The compass, or the ruler, should not be modified in the
meanwhile, but should be rigid. For this reason, according to many empiri-
cists, the concept of equality of lengths is based on the physical concept of
a rigid body, or on something similar.14 Similarly, the comparison of angles
presupposes that one moves a rigid body. One would fall into a vicious circle,
if one wanted to define at the same time a rigid body as a body whose points
have invariable distance from each other—as happens when one presupposes
geometry. To understand how one could get to the pure concept of a rigid
body independently from geometry, and in full accordance with experience,
we should imagine for ourselves the perceptions that we experience when on
the one hand we moved back and forth a so-called rigid object and when on
the other hand we worked a piece of wax or clay. In both cases some vari-
able visual representations, which are accompanied by tactile sensations and
muscular feelings letting us perceive the effort of our action, follow one an-
other. At the same time, it occurs to us that we govern the modifications by
means of our will, and so we immediately become aware of the impulses of our
will. One will remark that in the first case the same visual representations
can always be reproduced easily, whereas in the second case we manage to
do so only through very hard efforts. The two cases of rigid versus flexible
bodies can be distinguished by the ease with which the visual representations
can be reproduced.
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One could similarly arrive, in pure accordance with experience, to the con-
cept of an invariable, rigid body. If one admits that a comparison of two
distances by means of a compass is an observation that needs no developed in-
tuition nor any developed geometrical concepts, then one will also concede that
there is what Helmholtz called physical geometry,15 namely a geometry that
is in pure accordance with experience, because one can obtain theorems just
from the comparison of distances. One could, for example, imagine two physi-
cal models, each one with five prominent points that could be distinguished in
both models by the same five colors. Now, let’s compare the distance between
two points on one model and the distance between two points having the same
color in the other model. A similar comparison might be carried out ten times:
given that one finds a correspondence between the distances nine times, then it
follows that one finds the correspondence the tenth time too. This experience
repeats itself whenever one repeats the test with other models. So, a theorem
would follow inductively from measurement.16
Certainly, a strict follower of Kant would still suspect that any of those
results obtained through measurement were already influenced by ready and
exact intuition taken as a condition of any experience. Maybe, if he wants
to hold on to his point of view, he could not be refuted. On the other hand,
it cannot be denied that his standpoint is artificial, and it seems legitimate
to drop that standpoint, if one believes one can do without it. It seems to
me that the empiricist view already has an advantage in the fact that it al-
lows a detailed explanation of intuition, while the hypothesis assumed by the
follower of Kant cuts off all the rest. Indeed, it is always an advantage to
set up new problems.
On the nature of intuition and its relation to geometry one might want to
take into account the history of geometry, or even the development of intuition
in a single individual. If the history of geometry could nowadays establish in
a more precise way how the fundamental concepts of this science developed
in mankind, this would surely shed light on these questions. Probably, in
ancient times geometry had the character of an experimental science in the
strict sense of the word, because at that time it had mainly practical ends. The
geometry of Egyptians was probably limited to some empirical rules applied by
master builders and land measurers, while only the Greeks gradually learned
to prove all truths of geometry from a small number of axioms.17 But this
ancient development of geometry is so cloaked in darkness that we cannot
draw completely certain conclusions.
Given also that the development of the intuition of space in a single person
can hardly be observed, there remains just one way to further explore the
nature of intuition: an analysis of the simplest18 facts of perception, which
might in some cases be supported by the knowledge of the construction of our
sense organs.19
Maybe such a psychological and physiological analysis will lead to results
that will be later acknowledged once and for all, or maybe the problem in ques-
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tion will always receive different answers depending on the individual philo-
sophical standpoint. Anyway, it is possible to consider the whole construction
of geometry independently from that question, investigating what assumptions
are effectively used by geometry, no matter where they come from, and observ-
ing how other knowledge is derived from these assumptions by a succession
of smaller and more certain steps, namely, how geometers work deductively .
To this purpose, one should go through all proofs of geometry, decompose
them into their smaller steps, and pay attention to all the assumptions that
are thereby made, explicitly or tacitly. It is sufficient to do this for elemen-
tary geometry, because higher geometry would yield no essentially new results
with respect to the mentioned purpose. A series of important investigations
has been made by mathematicians on the foundations of geometry, with the
purpose of establishing all the axioms that are used, reducing them to the
smallest number possible, and showing that the remaining axioms are inde-
pendent from each other. There has also been a successful attempt to modify
one of the axioms, and to build a non-Euclidean geometry such that the usual
geometry is in some sense a special case of it or, more precisely, a borderline
case.20 Less complete is the investigation of geometrical deduction itself.
I will study the latter by means of a simple example, recalling the proof
of the theorem of the sum of the angles in a triangle. This proof rests on two
facts that hold for parallel lines, and that can be formulated as follows:21
1. When two straight lines lying on a plane do not intersect, no matter how
far they are extended—i.e. when they are parallel lines—then they form
equal angles with a straight line that intersects them in some way, and
in particular the angles that lie between the parallel lines on opposite
sides of the intersecting straight line are equal.
2. For any point, there is a line that is parallel to a given straight line.
The first fact, though slightly differently formulated, corresponds to the
axiom by Euclid that we simply call the axiom of parallel lines and that is
dropped in non-Euclidean geometries.22 The second fact appears in Euclid as
a theorem that can be proved on the basis of certain axioms; it corresponds to
Proposition 31 of Book I. For the present purpose, we can consider this fact
as an axiom.
Now, to prove the theorem of the sum of the angles, I will—for the sake of
simplicity—consider a triangle which is upright and whose surface is directly
in front of me. Let’s consider that one side is horizontal and let’s take it as the
base line. From the apex let’s trace a line parallel to the base: according to
the assumed representation, this line is also an horizontal straight line. There
appear now three angles at the apex: the median is an angle of the triangle,
while the other two have both been generated just now. From the first of the
aforementioned propositions about parallel lines it results that these two angles
are equal to the angles situated on the triangle’s base line, and in particular
the angle situated to the left of the apex is equal to the angle situated on the
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left-hand side of the triangle’s base, while the angle situated to the right of
the apex is equal to the angle situated on the right-hand side of the triangle’s
base. Now the three angles of the triangle are represented by means of three
angles situated at the apex; these angles together fill up the flat space on the
underside of the line we traced parallel to the base line, and thus their sum
equals two right angles.
The parallel line traced through the apex of the triangle is an essential step
of this proof. It has already been remarked many times that in a geometrical
proof the figure is almost always expanded through auxiliary lines.23 The
possibility to trace the auxiliary line rests here on the second proposition
about parallel lines, saying that through any point there is a parallel to any
straight line. This is an existential proposition. It has already been suggested
with insistence that existential propositions play a role in geometry.24
Concerning the conclusion inferred here, it seems to me that it does not fit
the usual forms of scholastic logic.25 I would rather describe it in the following
way. We imagine a series of geometrical elements that should be built in a
determinate sequence according to certain axioms; relations between these
elements are thereby also given. Now, we have several axioms at our disposal
saying that if certain relations occur between several elements, then further
relations must subsist between these elements alone, or between these elements
and other elements. By means of these rules we can derive further properties
of our figure. Besides, since existential propositions allow the introduction of
an unlimited number of new elements in the figure, we can find many other
relations from the known relations in the figure. Even if the execution of this
procedure follows certain rules, its results cannot be foreseen in full detail,
unless one carries out the procedure in a given way. We are thus obliged to
seek and fumble: we make some kind of experiment on whose account we
finally predict how the measurements that we carried out on a precisely drawn
figure, or on a model, should turn out to be. We have thus replaced a real
experiment by a thought experiment: this is what deduction consists in.26
Now, what role does intuition play in deduction itself? Are the elements
being combined in the deduction, and the rules according to which they are
combined, all what is taken from intuition, or respectively from experience? Or
does intuition co-operate also in the single steps of deduction? The latter point
of view has been mainly defended by philosophers and seems to have been also
Kant’s point of view, as he saw in intuition the essential principle for obtaining
geometrical knowledge.27 This is also the reason why most philosophers reject
non-Euclidean geometries. They consider Euclid’s axiom of parallel lines as
necessarily given within intuition,28 and consider any geometry that operates
intuitively with some other assumption as an absurdity.
To clarify the role of intuition in a proof, I’ll now go back to the previous
example. One must concede that we have here taken from intuition that those
three angles on the triangle’s apex fill up the angular space of two right angles,
and that the angles near the parallel lines are located in such a way that they
Intuition and Reasoning in Geometry 21
are equal, and do not complement each other so as to form two right angles.
Something else is often taken to be extracted immediately from intuition. For
example, one will readily concede, on the basis of intuition, that the bi-secants
of two of the angles of the triangle intersect at a point inside the triangle,
whereas one would not assume by a mere appeal to intuition the fact that the
bi-secant of the third angle goes through the same point.
It has already been suggested that we judge the intuitive picture somehow
immediately, and that these immediate judgments play a role in a geometrical
proof, although only rough judgements are endorsed in that way, whereas we
deal with finer judgements by the artificial method of deduction.29 A rough
judgement on the mental image of a triangle tells us that the bi-secant lines of
two angles of the triangle intersect inside the triangle, but it cannot be proved
with certainty on the basis of our intuitive picture that the third bi-secant
goes through the same intersection point, because our intuitive picture always
has a certain indetermination.
As a matter of fact, we usually behave as described above. The proce-
dure remains valid also in practice, but from a theoretical point of view it
has a double disadvantage. Firstly, we might be unsure as to the distinc-
tion between rough judgments and fine judgments. Secondly, the intuitive
picture that we have before us, is just one single picture, but it is taken to
be typical for all configurations that the figure of the theorem to be proved
could produce. Thus, the geometrical proof in this form actually contains an
inference by analogy.
On the other hand, the latter remark has also been considered wrong,
because we imagine the figure on which we execute a proof, as in motion, and
we disregard all the configurations that it might assume. It would thus be
a complete induction rather than an inference by analogy, and we would be
certain of the general validity of our observation. Those who consider intuition
as a very special principle of knowledge attach great weight to the power of
our inner intuition to set its own pictures in motion.30 But if one actually tries
to represent a similar process of movement case by case, one discovers that it
works only with very simple figures. If one considers two straight lines that
intersect, one in a fixed position, and the other rotating around the intersection
point, one would easily see that in all cases four angles are generated, namely
two pairs of equal angles. In complicated cases, a similar thing would be nearly
impossible: one never actually conjures up a complex figure in its entirety as
in motion, but only singular parts of it—and only in certain kinds of proofs.
One would have to assume the cooperation of an inference by analogy
in a geometrical proof, were it not possible to give a different form to this
proof. But this is indeed the case.31 The use that we make of intuition in
the proof can be reduced to certain rules: this amounts to the formulation of
some axioms that are commonly used, and that were already tacitly used by
Euclid. For example, one needs the following axiom: if A, B, C, D are points
of a straight line, and B lies between A and D, and C lies between B and D,
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then B lies between A and C, and C lies between A and D. Axioms of this
kind have recently been called “axioms of order” by Hilbert.32
Euclid makes a particular use of intuition in the proof of the first propo-
sition on congruence. This proposition says that if two sides and the included
angle of two triangles are congruent, then the other parts of the triangles are
congruent too. This is proved by hinting at the fact that if a triangle is moved
forward without alteration of its form and size, it overlaps the other. This
proof does not correspond to the previous description of deduction. On the
contrary, it consists in an immediate hint to intuition, or, if we prefer, to the
experiences made through the movement of rigid bodies.33 The theorem of
congruence under discussion expresses thus a primarily intuitive content, and
must then be considered as axiomatic.34
By means of such a formulation of all intuitive assumptions, one can di-
vest geometrical deduction itself of intuition. If one denotes the geometrical
elements and the operations on these elements through symbols and through
successions of symbols—just as in algebra one symbolically represents the nu-
merical magnitudes and the operations to be carried out on them—so, in the
simplest cases, it is possible to entirely reduce the geometrical deduction into
a calculus that is carried out on symbols, just as in algebra the inferences
concerning numerical magnitudes are carried out by means of the so-called
letter-calculus.35 Such a calculus has already been accomplished for single
domains of geometry; Peano has assembled these symbolical procedures.36
This is a realization of an idea that Leibniz had first enunciated in 1679 in
a letter to the famous physicist Huyghens. In this passage Leibniz expresses
himself as follows:37 “I have found some principles of a new language of sym-
bols that is completely different from algebra, and that allows us to advanta-
geously represent in thought, in a precise and adequate manner, and without
figures, anything that depends on intuition.” In a following passage of the
same letter,38 Leibniz suggests a much broader application of his language of
symbols, showing his characteristic overestimation of conceptual operations.39
Huyghens proves to be, from the very beginning, very skeptical about the
new method.40 But it cannot be denied that such a purely formal inference
method, which is dressed-up as a calculus, can be adequately applied only
to very limited domains.
If, in the aforementioned manner, we divest the geometrical inferences of
intuition, we can say with full certainty that something follows from given as-
sumptions, and we can do it even if these assumptions contradict intuition. So,
it follows with certainty from Lobachevsky’s assumptions that in no triangle
can the sum of the angles be greater than two right angles, and that if it is
smaller than two right angles in one triangle, then it must really be smaller
than two right angles in any triangle.41
The mentioned form of deduction, to some extent its pure representation,
is not the usual way of geometrical discovery. The latter is mainly guided by
intuitive pictures, and sometimes by observations that are made in a series of
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cases, i.e., guided by analogy and induction, just as often in all mathematical
domains some results obtained inductively show the direction along which the
deductive discovery will be made.42
We distinguished in geometry between primary concepts (taken from intu-
ition or experience) on the one hand, and geometrically constructed concepts
on the other hand. But in fact it also happens that concepts which were
clearly immediately abstracted from intuition, can later be deduced. The dif-
ferent treatments of the theory of proportions provide an instructive example
for that. The concept of the proportion of lengths is closely related to the
concept of similarity of bodies and plane figures. It may be taken as an im-
mediate intuitive fact that we can reproduce a body with its proper form but
on a different scale. In this case the edges of the reproduction have the same
ratio to each other as the edges of the original body; also all angles remained
unchanged. If one admits from the outset the possibility of constructing for
any body a similar body at any scale,43 all propositions of the theory of pro-
portions can easily be found. We might even have formed the concept of
proportion according to the fact that there are similar bodies.44 On the con-
trary, Euclid bases the existence of geometrically similar bodies on the theory
of proportions.45 He however reduced even the concept of the proportion to
more simple concepts. I shall now enlarge on the concept of the measure of
length in order to appreciate these ideas developed by Euclid46 which formerly
were not understood for a long time and were held to be dispensable.
In geometry one sometimes starts with the concept of the measure of length
without properly having established this concept. In doing so it is taken for
granted that all the lengths occurring in a figure have a determinate numerical
ratio to one of them chosen by us. The length chosen is then called the unit
of length. The number indicating how often the unit is contained in a line
segment is called the measure-number of this line segment. The line segment
to be measured can be either commensurable or incommensurable to the unit;
in the latter case the measure-number will be irrational. The measure-number
of a square’s diagonal for example is irrational if the side of the square is chosen
as the unit.
A closer look however reveals a difficulty in the concept of measure. For
sake of simplicity let us consider two commensurable line segments. In or-
der to conceive their length ratio as a numerical ratio we have to imagine an
additional line segment both given line segments are multiples of. It lies in
commensurability that such a third line segment exists; there is however more
than one such line segment. What would we do if we could yield different
numerical ratios as measuring results when choosing a different third line seg-
ment? In order to establish the concept of measure, we have to prove that this
is not possible. In fact we could admit this concept without foundation; this
is equivalent to the assumption of new and basically complicated axioms.
The proof mentioned can nevertheless be done by means of the two facts
that equals added to equals yield equals and that the greater added to the
24 Otto Hölder
greater yields the greater.47 These facts may be regarded as axioms.48 Adding
the Archimedean axiom, according to which we can exceed any line segment
by means of multiplication of any given line,49 and taking into account also
the propositions on parallels and congruence allows us to construct in the
style of Euclid the whole theory of proportions and similar figures.50 The
definition of proportion used by Euclid51 and by means of which he reduces,
as mentioned above, this concept to simpler ones can be stated as follows: Two
line segments a and b have the same ratio as a′ and b′ if any multiple µa of a
is, in comparison, smaller than, equal to, or greater than any multiple νb of b,
depending on whether the according multiple µa′ of a′ is smaller than, equal
to, or greater than the according multiple νb′ of b′.52 This definition applies
to two incommensurable line segments as well as to commensurable ones.
Galilei put forward a different treatment of proportions, which aimed at
simplifying the Euclidean account. In doing so, however, he had to postulate
the concept of proportion along with several axioms referring to it.53 The way
he carries out the proof does not satisfy the claim of presupposing as little as
possible. For this reason, from a scientific point of view, Euclid’s account has
to be considered as the more complete one.
Recently Hilbert presented a completely new derivation of the theory of
proportions.54 In this account even the Archimedean axiom is avoided.
In this derivation—as in the Euclidean one—the concept “equal” appears
as a primary concept that several axioms in addition are held to apply to. The
concept of the ratio of lengths of two line segments as well as the concept of
the proportion of four line segments are constructed;55 the propositions about
proportions appear to be provable.56
The concept of content of plane figures and bodies has not been constructed
deductively by Euclid, but it is possible to do so. a In the case of bodies, one
may regard the content as an empirical concept extracted from the usage
of measures of capacity in measuring fluids, and in this way one may also
get to the content of plane figures. Euclid takes it for granted that figures
have a content, and that to them also the axioms apply that equals added to
equals yield equals and the greater added to the greater yields the greater.
If however one does not want to presuppose the concept of content, but to
establish it geometrically, one first and foremost has to show that figures, in
particular figures of different form, can be compared as to their magnitude.
As a first step congruent figures will be declared to be equal; the figure that
completely comprises the other figure will be called the greater one. In order
a. As regards the concept of content [Inhalt ], Joel Michell remarks in a note to
his and Catherine Ernst’s translation of Hölder’s The Axioms of Quantity: “Hölder’s
term Inhalt literally means contents and, so, is more abstract than either of the
English terms area or volume (Flächeninhalt and Rauminhalt in German, respec-
tively). Since contents is not a specifically quantitative concept in English, trans-
lating Inhalt as contents would cause Hölder’s term to lose an essential ingredient.
Spatial magnitude might be a better choice, but there is evidence [. . . ] that he may
have meant area”, [Hölder 1996, 251].
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to compare any two figures, they have however to be cut through, and it must
be proved that the result of the comparison does not depend on the actual
way this is done.57
The construction of the proportions of line segments as well as of the con-
cept of content presupposes that certain geometrical operations are repeated
an indefinite number of times. Indeed, in the consideration of proportion, we
had to take the nth multiple of a line segment, n being an indeterminate num-
ber. Into such considerations general concepts of arithmetic enter and such
questions cannot always be solved in a mechanical calculus.58 Together with
arithmetical, or in general combinatorical, concepts, more complicated modes
of inference occur within the ambit of geometry.
The method of exhaustion which permits us to evaluate figures of curvilin-
ear boundary provides an example for this kind of inference.59 Let me take the
surface of a circle as an example. Its content equals the content of a triangle
having the circle’s circumference as its base and the radius as its height. The
comparison of the contents, required in the proof, cannot be done by means
of a number of decompositions. Rather certain comparative figures have to be
found which serve as an intermediary and only approximately represent the
circular surface. An inscribed regular octagon for instance can be compared
first to the circular surface and then to the triangle, by which it is found that
the triangle and the circular surface in any case do not differ by more than the
half of the latter. The difficulties involved in this comparison here might be
passed over. Hereafter a regular hexadecagon might be inscribed in the circle,
and thus it can be shown that the triangle and the circular surface differ by
less than a quarter of the circular surface. This goes on in the same manner.
By means of the regular inscribed polygon of 2n+2 edges, it is shown that
the triangle differs from the circular surface by less than a 2nth of the latter.
Everyone will understand instinctively that from this the exact equality of the
circular and the triangular surfaces can be concluded.
For the sake of logical rigor it should be noted that we are actually dealing
with an infinity of results. The difference between the figures in question is
less than 1/2, than 1/4, than 1/8 of the circle. We are sure of all of these
results, notwithstanding their unlimited number, for they arise in a uniform
manner; the series of considerations they result from proceeds according to a
law and thus can be covered by a single view. All of these infinite results are
only approximative. The result concluded from them consists in a perfectly
exact proposition. In order to get to this proposition, things have to be put
otherwise. The fact we make use of here is that the difference of the contents of
two surfaces—the surface of the triangle and the surface of the circle—can be
represented as a determinate surface. The consideration of this surface leads
into a contradiction. The proof is thus indirect.60
I shall now elaborate on this proof. The surface mentioned is duplicated
in thought, the surface thus obtained duplicated again and so forth. By a suf-
ficient number of repetitions of duplications any given piece of a surface will
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necessarily be exceeded. This follows from the Archimedean axiom as applied
to surfaces. The surface in question shall now be duplicated n times with n
chosen such that the surface of the circle will be exceeded. Consequently, the
2nth multiple of the surface is greater than the circle, and, accordingly, the
surface—i.e., the difference between the surface of the circle and the surface of
the triangle—is greater than a 2nth of the surface of the circle. This however
contradicts the result obtained before by means of the inscribed polygon of
2n+2 edges. From this contradiction follows the incorrectness of the only un-
certain assumption introduced, the assumption namely that the surface of the
circle and the surface of the triangle differ in their content. I think that this
example at once shows that geometry cannot do without indirect proofs.61
Wherever it can be applied in the exact sciences, deduction appears in a
way quite similar to how I characterized its role in geometry. This is partic-
ularly clear in mechanics. I hold most of the proofs appearing in mechanics
to be as good proofs as any proof of geometry, even though they require sup-
positions which are generally held to originate from experience.62 Empiricists
indeed also hold the geometrical axioms to originate from experience, without
rejecting the deductive method by virtue of which science augments its knowl-
edge. Such an empirical fact which plays in mechanics the role of a postulate
(axiom) is, e. g., that the point where a force acts on a rigid body can be shifted
in the line of the force without altering its effect. Galilei’s principle of inertia
as well as Newton’s “leges”63 are such postulates. These postulates and the
concepts—force (attractive and repulsive force, pressure, tension), rigid con-
nection, mass, time, place—between which the postulates establish relations,
result by way of a certain generalization and idealization64 from empirical ob-
servations. They may count as evident insofar as most people let themselves
be determined by everyday life alone to recognize the concepts and connections
of concepts as valid.65
Neither the postulates (axioms) nor the primitive concepts of mechanics
are of logical necessity. All attempts to define satisfactorily the primitive
concepts failed. They can be explained only by reference to the simple facts
they were extracted from.66
We make use of the primitive concepts of mechanics in quite a similar way
to the primitive concepts of geometry.67 In deductions only a formal use is
made of these concepts. The real application of the concepts according to their
content would be the application to the objects that the concepts refer to. In
spatial geometry, in order to prove the mutual relations of points, straight lines
and planes a purely formal use is made of the fact that a straight line which
has two points in common with a plane completely lies in this plane. This fact
is applied in the real world by the stone-cutter who applies his rod to the block
he is working on in order to achieve a flat surface. In the same sense we make
a formal use of the concept of force in the theory of the equilibrium, whereas
we really apply the concept in any material device involving the production
of pressure or tension. In deduction we thus do not operate with the objects
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themselves; but rather we operate theoretically with the mutual relations of
the objects.
It may be that we cannot present deduction in mechanics in as a pure
way as in geometry. It may be that in mechanics—having a rather material
content—we unconsciously use certain empirical analogies in addition to the
axioms. In any case it is correct that in mechanical deduction, too, we com-
pletely abandon—at least temporarily—the object investigated and perform
independently from this object a thought experiment, relying on the fact that
its result must finally be in accordance with the object. That we can success-
fully apply such a procedure rests on the exact—and in a certain sense verified,
though not properly provable68—validity of the laws which we found by virtue
of experience and which we considered as generally true. This is the reason
why this kind of deduction can be applied in the exact sciences; nonetheless
it would only be in vain to try to apply to the forms of organic life or even
to the historical sciences a procedure which can be applied to mathematics,
mechanics, and certain parts of astronomy and physics.69
The procedure of deduction consists in inferences of a peculiar form as has
been shown in the preceding examples. The mathematical sciences thus indeed
have a particular method. Reasoning in itself of course is always the same and
always consists in the very same simple mental activities. The particularity of
the mathematical sciences rests in the object which permits us to perform a
long series of thought operations in characteristic connections so that in this
way particular forms of conclusions emerge. In this sense it can be said that
mathematics and the exact sciences have a logic of their own.
Notes
1 Euclid constructs the square in Prop. 46 of Book I (cf. [Euclid & Heiberg 1883]).
2 Euclid’s definition of a straight line does not contain any construction and is to
be conceived as a mere nominal definition (Book I, Definition 4); indeed, no use is
made of this definition afterwards.
3 In his Lectures on Modern Geometry, Pasch explains the notion of a point as
follows: “The bodies whose division is incompatible with the limits of observation are
always called points, whereas in geometry the word ‘body’ is reserved for a different
use.” Pasch alludes here to the abstraction by means of which we are able to think
of the concept of a point [Pasch 1882]. Anyway, in the construction of geometry this
definition has been used as rarely as any other definition of a point that has ever been
given.
4 As a matter of fact, we hardly distinguish between axioms and postulates; when
we do, we simply want to express a nuance in our conception: whereas by the word
‘axiom’ we want to emphasize the fact that it is a very certain assumption, by the
word ‘postulate’ we emphasize the fact that the generality of the rule that has been
put forward is actually something that is only assumed by us. In Euclid there are
two groups of principles: the aitémata (postulata) and the koinaí ennoiaí (communes
animi conceptiones), the latter being called axiómata by Proclus. According to the
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latter, Euclid considered the former principles as postulates, and the latter as self-
evident truths. This seems to be quite plausible also with respect to the content of the
principles, if one considers the repartition of the principles to be found in Heiberg’s
edition of the axioms, which is based on a rigorous analysis of the sources [Euclid &
Heiberg 1883]. In other editions the repartition is different (cf. e.g., the 1781 German
translation by Lorenz based on the 1703 Oxford edition [Lorenz 1781].)
5 The first of the mentioned facts is included by Euclid in the first postulate, the
second is missing in Heiberg’s edition, but it appears as the 12th axiom in other
editions. This axiom, which might thus constitute a later addition, says that two
straight lines cannot encompass any space. If one could join two points in a plane
by means of two different straight line segments, these would encompass a surface;
thus, it follows from axiom 12 that there can be only one straight line that joins two
points. Facts of the kind here considered are called by Hilbert axioms of connection
[Hilbert 1899, 5].
6 One could contest that the axioms of geometry are necessary in the Kantian
sense; they might be necessary only in the same sense in which one calls natural laws
necessary. But if one wants to infer some kind of inner necessity of the axioms—from
the mutual agreement of different consequences that can be derived from them—
then one could reply that the non-Euclidean geometry is in itself as consistent as the
Euclidean geometry (compare note 20). In this regard, mathematical investigations
on non-Euclidean geometry have supported an empirical conception in the theory of
knowledge. For example Benno Erdmann claims that the new geometrical knowledge
has a negative impact on the rationalist theory [Erdmann 1877, 116].
According to the empirical theory, the axioms cannot be called strictly necessary;
something that is strictly necessary might of course follow from them, but what is
required is the universal validity of the axioms (compare also [Mill 1869, 254]).
7 In the Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Critique of Pure Reason], 1st ed., 1781,
Doctrine of Elements, Part 1 [The Transcendental Aesthetic], Section 1 [On Space], § 2
[Metaphysical Exposition of this Concept, A 24] Kant says that space is a “necessary
and a priori” idea that grounds all external intuitions and should be regarded “as the
condition for the possibility of phenomena, and not as a determination depending on
them” [Kant 1781-1787, 175]. In an add-on from the 2nd edition of 1787 (Doctrine of
Elements, Part 1, Section 1, § 3 [Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space,
B 41]) it is stated even more clearly that the idea of space is “a pure, non empirical
intuition”, and that this intuition “has its place merely in the subject, as its formal
quality of being affected by objects and thereby receive immediate representation,
i.e., intuition, of them” [Kant 1781-1787, 176]. Then, on this necessity of the idea
of space is grounded the “apodeictic certainty of all geometrical principles” [Kant
1781-1787, 1st ed., nr. 3–4]. It is fully clear here, that Kant takes the single axioms to
actually arise from pure intuition, because he says in the mentioned passage: “Thus
also all geometric principles, e.g., that in a triangle two sides taken together are
always greater than the third, are never derived from the general concepts of line
and triangle, but rather derived from intuition, and indeed derived a priori and with
apodeictic certainty.” (This is a fact that I would not even rate among the principles.)
8 It is not my aim to go into all the conceptions that the inventors of different
philosophical systems held of space and spatial intuition. Compare here [Baumann
1869], and [Wundt 1883, 85–96].
9 Compare [Newton 1687, Preface], and [Helmholtz 1884, vol. 2, 217]. Of course,
the advocates of this empirical viewpoint will not deny that any elaboration of ex-
perience comes out from assumptions, at least from the assumption of a certain
conformity to laws of the investigated object, which we could not otherwise grasp
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conceptually (compare in particular [Helmholtz 1884, vol. 2, 266ff.]). Indeed, any
single fact of experience, if expressed by means of concepts—and how could one want
to express it otherwise—is the result of a mental elaboration of experience. But unlike
Kant’s conception, empiricism emphasizes the fact that according to the empirical
viewpoint, no law referring to external objects comes about independently from ex-
ternal experience. Kant says on the contrary that geometrical knowledge comes from
intuition and that intuition is independent of experience.
10 If one uses for example a micrometer screw in measurement, then one infers
the displacement of the longitudinal axis of the screw from the rotations and their
fractional parts. In measurements of this kind one already uses a set of relations
from the science of geometry. So, the observations on which one would like to ground
geometry should anyway have a much simpler nature than a measurement of that
kind.
11 When the observer steps in between the objects, he will certainly be able to
see only one part at a time; but certainly, if from his standpoint two of them are
overlapping, then all the objects he can see will be overlapping.
12 For a Kantian, the fact that, from a determinate viewer’s standpoint, certain
small bodies overlap, is the reason why the viewer—following the intuition that he
has independently from experience and by means of which the essence of the straight
line is fully given to him—designs the places of those bodies as rectilinear. For the
empiricist, the straight line is nothing else but a concept that is abstracted from the
occurrence of the overlapping of small bodies, or maybe from other similar occur-
rences.
When, following a well-known linguistic use, I designate the process of concept
construction as an “abstracting” or “extracting” process, I do not want to be associ-
ated with a theory that claims that the concept arises from a succession of ideas when
we “leave out” the features that differentiate ideas and keep the features they have in
common. When we build a concept from a succession of ideas, the ground will always
be that we perceive those ideas as immediately similar, and that, in accordance with
the linguistic use of other people, we learned the use of a word that expresses what
is typical in those ideas. We say that we have mastered the concept, when we believe
that we will be able, in future cases, to apply it with confidence and in agreement
with other people. Basically, we can never prove but only claim that we are able
to do this (compare [Volkelt 1886, 181ff.]). In particular, we require an absolutely
safe use of the concepts in the scientific treatment. For example, in geometry we act
not only as if we could pinpoint exact points and exact lines, but also as if we could
always distinguish, given a straight line and a point, whether the point lies on the
straight line or not, and in doing so the concept of this difference is also considered
as unconditionally applicable.
If considered from the empiricist point of view, the geometrical concepts appear at
first as hardly distinguishable from other empirical concepts obtained by abstraction.
The difference between the former and the latter concepts, which was strongly accen-
tuated by Wundt [Wundt 1883, vol. 2, 95], emerges only afterwards in the scientific
use of geometrical concepts, which influenced also their practical use (cf. note 64).
As we can extract or abstract a concept from a succession of ideas, we can also
abstract a rule from a succession of combinations of ideas, when we find that these
combinations are not only similar one to the other but also to a complex process
of consciousness, which thereby represents their connection and thus exhibits their
rule. For example, we might have noticed, in a series of cases, that a thread stretched
between two small rings takes a fully determinate position. We compare these obser-
vations to a conscious process, when we distinguish three elements and consider one
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of them as determined by the other two. Besides, if we postulate that our thoughts
are universally valid for all cases of the observed kind, we get to the rule: “Through
two points there always passes one and only one straight line.” Since the common
concept appears unitary in thought, and accordingly occurs mostly in association
with a single word, a rule of that kind is a “concept of higher order”, that displays a
logical structure [Volkelt 1886, 384].
13 ‘Immediate’ should simply mean here that we immediately judge to be similar
the successions of sensory perceptions, on which are based the visual images that
first appear as unitary to our consciousness. This does not contradict a conception of
physiology, according to which those comparisons of visual images are possible only
on the basis of eye-movements.
14 [Helmholtz 1884, vol. 2, 260]. One can also use the thread to compare distances.
An objection has been raised to this however, that a comparison of distances is
possible only by means of an inelastic thread, and that there is indeed no feature
that can distinguish an inelastic from an elastic thread apart from the invariability
of the length of the former: so one would end up moving in a circle. Against this
objection, I would like to remark, that in the case of a piece of inelastic thread kept
stretched between two hands, we cannot generate any visible variation by merely
intensifying our stretching effort, whereas in the case of an elastic thread we can do
that. So, we have here a feature of the inelastic thread that does not presuppose the
given concept of length.
One could probably try to define the concept of equality of line segments also in
many other ways (cf. Helmholtz’s Bemerkungen über ‘physische Gleichwerthigkeit’
von Raumgrössen, [Helmholtz 1884, vol. 2]). The above explanation just aims at
showing that one can indeed consider the concepts ‘equal’, ‘bigger’, ‘smaller’ as ex-
tracted from certain empirical activities, without having to concede a claim that has
already been advanced [Zindler 1889, 11], that any comparative activity of that kind
already contains the concepts of length and equality. Basically, the following appear
thus as facts of experience: that two line segments being equal to a third are equal
to each other; and that given three line segments such that the second is smaller
than the first, and the third is smaller than the second, then the third has also to be
smaller than the first.
The fact that two magnitudes being equal to one and the same third magnitude
are equal to each other is described by Sigwart [Sigwart 1889, vol. 1, 414] as an
analytical fact, i.e., it is described as a proposition that follows from the concept of
equality. In some sense, this will be conceded by everybody, insofar as the mentioned
fact is apparently inextricably associated in our consciousness with the concept of
‘equal’. However, one should not forget that a different intuitive content or, if one
prefers, empirical content can be attributed to this proposition, depending on the
use we make of it. The equality of line segments is something different from the
equality of angles, or even from the equality of surface portions of different form.
Besides, the mentioned proposition does not appear to me to be a consequence of
the so-called principle of identity, because objects that are declared to be equal do
always differ in some other respect, and are thus not logically identical. We could
most correctly say, with Helmholtz [Helmholtz 1887, vol. 3, 356ff., 375–376] that by
the term ‘equal’ we designate a relation between two things such that, whenever
the relation subsists between a and b, one can infer that the same relation subsists
between b and a, and whenever the relation subsists at the same time between a and b
and between b and c, one can infer that it subsists between a and c. However, whether
a relation is of that kind, might result, in the mentioned case, only from the nature
of the concerned objects.
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In certain circumstances, in particular, one could as well say that a fact is ab-
stracted from experience, or that it arises immediately from a concept, inasmuch as
the concept is taken, together with the fact associated to it, from experience or intu-
ition. However, there can never be any disagreement whether a fact can or cannot,
in the proper sense of the word, be deduced from others, i.e., whether an already
obtained deduction of that kind is binding or not.
15 [Helmholtz 1896, vol. 2, 260ff.], where the author gives a convincing example.
16 This would be an induction that does not rest on any deduction. On the relation
between induction and deduction one finds apparently opposite views. Some say that
deduction is always grounded in facts that are discovered inductively [Wundt 1883,
vol. 2, 27], others say that induction relies on the results of demonstrative logic,
i.e., on deduction [Lotze 1874, 340], [Sigwart 1893, vol. 2, 384–385]. The two theses
can be combined, up to a certain degree. The first one, which anyway seems to me
inappropriate for arithmetic, might be correct for all sciences that concern objects
of experience in the strict sense of the word. It is correct, insofar as certain facts
of a general kind (laws) are inductively obtained from experience, and exactly these
facts provide the rules along which deduction proceeds. On the other hand, there
are complicated inductions that become possible, only after one has obtained certain
concepts that arise from a deductive elaboration of a domain of knowledge. When,
for example, we induce from many observations that in the case of a falling body the
spaces traversed from the beginning of the fall are proportional to the squares of the
falling times, then we must possess not only a general concept of the process that
we call ‘to fall’, but also the concept of a square number, which has its source in the
deductively elaborated domain of arithmetic.
On the contrary, it seems to me that the intellectual activity that from the
beginning goes hand in hand with experience, when we build concepts of experience,
is a preliminary activity that should not be assigned neither to deduction nor to
induction.
17 [Cantor 1880, vol. 1, 46ff.], [Hankel 1874, 88]. Compare also the interesting
remarks by Kant in the Preface to the 2nd edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.
18 That is, of the facts that are most simple for our consciousness.
19 Localization is a problem whose solution, requiring psychology and physiology,
should greatly clarify the nature of our intuition of space. The importance of the
localization problem will certainly be denied by those who consider the pure intu-
ition of space as a condition of any perception. But they must certainly admit that
the empirical part of my perception, i.e., also my sensory perceptions, must contain
something that allows me, in a single case, to locate an object in this way, and not
otherwise, namely to see the object in this determinate position and not in some other
position with respect to my body (cf. the theory of ‘local signs’ by Lotze, [Lotze 1884,
547ff.]). Similarly, there must be an empirical reason why I see an object, in a given
instant, exactly in the form in which it appears to me, and not in one of the other
forms that would be possible according to the laws of ‘pure intuition’. This concession
could already be considered as conflicting with Kant’s conception, according to which
the form of the perceptions should have its source in the intuition of space, which
is independent from experience. One could at any rate be tempted to understand
Kant in such a way that pure intuition, i.e., the form of perception, has nothing to
do with the empirical content of perception. But if, as Kant says, the geometrical
‘knowledge’ (laws)—which, according to him, must have its origin a priori—“perhaps
serve[s] only to establish a connection among our sensory representations” [Kant 1781-
1787, 1st edition, Introduction, 128], then one should undoubtedly understand Kant
as saying that in a singular case we obtain from the senses certain empirical data,
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and that from these data, under the action of the laws of intuition, we delineate the
form of the object that stands before us, and we determine its position. Anyway,
since the observation of the object can be arbitrarily extended, it cannot be ignored
that then we should be able to avoid an arbitrary increase of those empirical data,
or we would obtain many more data than those that are necessary to determine the
intuitive picture of the object. Anyway, all these empirical data, with the help of
the laws of intuition, produce a corresponding picture of the object: this can only be
explained, according to me, by the assumption that the laws of intuition have at the
same time the function of exhibiting a valid order for the empirical part of perception.
But then we would basically be back to the empirical point of view.
20 The task of building a simple and complete system of independent axioms for
Euclidean geometry has recently been solved by Hilbert [Hilbert 1899]. The geome-
tries that differ from the usual Euclidean geometry had their point of departure in
the efforts to prove Euclid’s axiom of parallel lines. The latter is the 11th axiom
in Heiberg’s edition, and the 5th axiom in other editions, cf. [Lobachevsky & Engel
1899, 373–383]. For the purpose of that proof, it was at first tentatively assumed
that the axiom of parallel lines was not satisfied, originally with the intention to de-
rive a contradiction from this assumption. But the contradiction did not ensue, and
non-Euclidean geometries were developed from such considerations.
Lobachevsky was the first (1829) to publish a fully accomplished geometry with-
out the mentioned axiom (this geometry, which was also discovered by Gauß, was dis-
covered independently by other authors; for further details, cf. [Lobachevsky & Engel
1899]). Lobachevsky used the so-called synthetic method, i.e., the usual geometrical
method. One could also use the ‘analytic’ method. This rests on the possibility—
which can be proved on the basis of Euclidean geometry—to establish the position of
a point in space through three measurements (this is the property of space that we
express by saying that space has three dimensions). One can thus relate the totality
of points in space to the totality of number triplets, which is expressed in words as
follows: the space can be conceived as a threefold infinite numerical manifold. If one
lets space correspond in such a way to a numerical manifold, then the relations of
position, and so on, that subsist in space between points, straight lines, and surfaces
are reflected into relations between numerical structures, and the same laws hold in
both cases. This conception opens up a new way to answer the question of possible
geometries—a way that was first developed by Riemann ([Riemann 1867]; [Riemann
1876, 254]), and afterwards further pursued especially by Helmholtz ([Helmholtz 1883,
vol. 2, 610, 618]; [Helmholtz 1884, vol. 2, 3]). These inquiries presuppose that the
relations of space might be exactly represented through certain dominant relations
in a numerical manifold (this requirement has been emphasized especially by Sophus
Lie, who also corrected the mentioned inquiries on several issues; cf. [Lie & Engel
1893, 393]), and are therefore only concerned with the structures of the numerical
manifold. As a result, in other similar threefold numerical multiplicities structures
have been defined whose reciprocal relations show laws that are both analogous to,
and different from, the laws into which usual geometry is reflected: one such new
case—discovered in that way—corresponds precisely to Lobachevsky’s geometry.
Anyway, these inquiries ensured that Lobachevsky’s geometry is in itself consis-
tent, while the original, pure synthetic treatment of this geometry did not at first
exclude the possibility that further additional considerations might later lead to con-
tradictions. It is sufficient to consider, for the moment, that by the words ‘point’,
‘straight line’, and so on, we intend to designate just those numerical structures in
the new numerical multiplicities. Thus, the axioms postulated for the new system
are satisfied, and therefore they cannot, at any rate, contradict one another.
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The relations of Lobachevsky’s geometry can also be represented with the help
of certain complicated conceptual constructions that are tied to Euclidean geometry
([Beltrami 1868, vol. 6, 284], [Klein 1871, vol. 4, 573ff.], [Klein 1873, vol. 6, 112ff.],
[Cayley 1872, vol. 5, 630ff.]). So, if one assumes that Euclidean geometry is in itself
consistent, the consistency of the new geometry is proved. However, the mentioned
assumption—generally and tacitly assumed before the discovery of non-Euclidean
geometries—primarily rested merely on the belief that the Euclidean geometry is
the true expression of certain objective relations. Of course, one could also prove
the consistency of Euclidean geometry by pointing to the numerical manifold that
represents it, as was done by Hilbert [Hilbert 1899, 19–21].
The consistency of the non-Euclidean geometry, in which the Euclidean postulate
does not hold but the other axioms are satisfied, ensues that no axiom can be infer-
entially derived from the others. This result is maybe the most important advantage
obtained through the inquiries into non-Euclidean geometries.
21 Some people try to elude the difficulties that lie in the parallel theory by intro-
ducing from the very beginning the concept of ‘direction’ (cf. [Zindler 1889, 7]), and
by defining the angle as ‘difference of direction’. In this case, certain axioms are set
by the way the concepts of ‘direction’ and ‘difference of direction’ are used. Firstly, in
this conception one tacitly postulates the fact that is highlighted in note 25, namely
that two straight lines lying on a surface and forming equal angles with an intersect-
ing straight line, form equal angles with any other intersecting line. Besides, in the
mentioned conception one also tends to tacitly presuppose the fact that straight lines
that lie on a surface and do no not intersect have the same direction, i.e., that they
form equal angles with a third straight line; but then one already presupposes the
axiom of parallel lines. However, with the the help of assumptions that are anyway
used, Euclid showed that the first fact follows from the second. Thus, if one assumes
the here-delineated conception, which is legitimate, provided one explicitly assumes
the axiom (cf. the remarks by Clebsch-Lindemann, [Clebsch 1891, vol. 2, part 1, 543,
note]), then one has not only deprived himself of the non-Euclidean geometry, but
also built the Euclidean geometry on a larger-than-necessary number of axioms.
Mill has suggested to modify the Euclidean definition of parallel straight lines
([Mill 1869, vol. 2, 156]). He wants to define two straight lines a and b as parallel, if
and only if they everywhere have the same distance one from the other. Given that
the distance between the parallel lines is measured by means of a line segment that
is perpendicular to both, Mill thus basically requires two properties: any straight
line that is perpendicular to a should also be perpendicular to b, and vice versa; and
the parts of all these perpendiculars that lie between a and b should be equal to one
another. Yet (in the usual plane geometry) it is also the case that two straight line are
parallel, when a third straight line is perpendicular to both. But this fact cannot be
derived from Mill’s definition, so it would have to be assumed axiomatically. Anyway,
from this fact and from Mill’s definition result two facts that can be expressed even
without the concept of parallel lines: 1) given two straight lines a and b, if a third
straight line is perpendicular to them, then any straight line that is perpendicular to
a is perpendicular to b; 2) in the supposed case, all the straight lines that lie between
a and b, and that are perpendicular to them, are equal. It seems now appropriate to
let these two facts come first, and add the definition of parallel lines afterwards. Of
the two facts 1) and 2), the second follows from the first with the help of the axioms
that are used in Euclidean geometry, with the exception of the axiom of parallel lines.
I do not doubt that if Mill had known this state of affairs, he would have carried out
a reduction of the second fact to the first, because he acknowledges [Mill 1869, vol. 2,
156, note, 146, note] the procedure by means of which one selects some properties
34 Otto Hölder
of a concept so as to derive its other properties. However fact number 1) remains
axiomatic.
No matter how one approaches the issue, the usual theory of parallel lines (apart
from some inessential changes) must be derived just as Euclid did it. It is not sufficient
to assume a definition of parallel lines; one also needs an axiom. If one does not
assume an axiom of parallel lines, then one obtains, beside the usual geometry, the
non-Euclidean geometry too.
22 Let’s imagine one traces all possible rays through a point—i.e., straight lines that
begin in the point and that go to infinity on one side—, and let g be a straight line
that does not go through the point, and that goes to infinity on both sides. All the
rays that intersect g thus fill an angle whose sides do not intersect the straight line g.
Now, whereas the Euclidean geometry consists in the assumption that this angle be
equal to two right angles, Lobachevsky assumes it to be smaller than two right angles
(cf. also note 41). It is also evident that the Euclidean geometry is a borderline case
of Lobachevsky’s geometry. Now, introducing without proof the fact that those rays
actually fill up an angle is equivalent to assuming an axiom. Lobachevsky gives a
proof of this fact that cannot be considered as fully rigorous, at least not in the given
version [Lobachevsky 1840, Th. 16, 7ff.]. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the fact
can be proved rigorously from more simple axioms, which must include the axioms
of order (note 32) and the continuity axioms (note 49).
23 [Sigwart 1893, vol. 2, 275, 280].
24 [Zindler 1889, 33]. The demonstrable existential proposition introduced in the
text rests, amongst others, on an axiom that establishes existence. Geometrical
existence is of course something different from the physical existence of an object,
yet I think it can be expressed more clearly by the word ‘existence’ rather than by
the word ‘possibility’.
25 The one-sidedness of the usual ‘syllogistic’ has been pointed out especially by
Lotze [Lotze 1874, 133]; it is not suitable neither for the various kinds of inferences
that are drawn in a science such as mathematics, nor for the various kinds of asser-
tions that occur here. A geometrical assertion, properly, always refers to reciprocal
properties of several geometrical elements (points, straight lines, and so on). I think
that mathematical inferences, should they be once represented in a purely formal
way, can be better conceived from the point of view adopted by English authors in
their “Logic of relatives” (cf. [Jevons 1877, 122]), rather than from the point of view
of the Aristotelian [syllogistic] figures.
According to me, the so-called principle of identity does not clarify mathematical
inferences either. For example, in many cases one could conceive the inferences that
are drawn from the propositions on parallel lines in the following way. From the
propositions on the parallel lines mentioned in the text together with the theorem it
follows that if two straight lines in a plane form—in the previously indicated way—
equal angles with a given straight line, then they form equal angles with any straight
line that intersects them. Here, we can also substitute in a given assertion a straight
line for another straight line. The mentioned theorem expresses thus a principle of
substitution that constitutes the rule according to which certain inferences proceed.
However, the inferences that can be drawn from this principle of substitution are not
analogous to the inferences that can be drawn from the logical principle of identity,
because here we do not substitute identical for identical, but rather different things
for different things.
26 [Kroman 1883, 26, 139].
27 [Kant 1781-1787, 1st edition 1781, 2nd part, 1st section, 2nd book, 2nd chap-
ter, § 3.1, 288]: “On this successive synthesis of the productive imagination, in the
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generation of shapes, is grounded the mathematics of extension (geometry) with its
axioms...” Cf. also [Kant 1781-1787, part 1, § 1.4]. By the way, from the mentioned
passages it cannot be derived with full clarity, whether Kant admits that only the
principles have their source in intuition, or rather assumes that intuition is at stake
in any step of a proof.
28 Sigwart says that the metric relations of space “are grounded on a necessity of
our spatial intuition that cannot be further analyzed”, whereas he understands by
‘metric relations of space’ the metric relations that Euclid has assumed as laws of
space [Sigwart 1893, vol. 2, 82, note].
29 [Kroman 1883, 92ff.].
30 [Kroman 1883, 74–79]. Sigwart too finds ([Sigwart 1893, vol. 2, 226]) that the
movement of points and straight lines in space is operant in all syntheses (construc-
tions), and when he speaks about the multiplicity of constructions that extends itself
into the inconceivable, he says: “but everywhere there is the same requirement: to
run through the whole extension of the assumed possibilities by means of a concep-
tual formula (what is meant here is a prescription of the construction), obtaining at
the same time the borderline cases, and tracing the limits of the extension for the
purpose of a classification” [Sigwart 1893, 227].
31 Cf. the examples given in notes 47 and 48.
32 Which facts concerning order one wants to assume as axioms, so as to prove the
others from them, is up to a certain degree arbitrary. Cf. [Pasch 1882, 5–7], where
similar axioms are established for the first time, and [Hilbert 1899, 6].
To the facts concerning order belongs another fact that has often been considered
as an axiom (cf. [Klein 1873, vol. 6, 113]): the infinite length of straight lines. This
infinite length distinguishes in quite an essential way the straight line from the circle,
which returns upon itself and has a finite extension. In exact terms, the fact that
holds for the straight line should be expressed as follows. Given two points A0 and
A1 on a straight line, we can imagine an unlimited succession of points A2, A3, A4, ...
constructed in such a way that A1 lies between A0 and A2, A2 lies between A1 and
A3, A3 lies between A2 and A4 and so on, generally Aν lies between Aν−1 and
Aν+1. We further imagine that the line segments A0A1, A1A2, A2A3, A3A4, ... are
all equal. Then, one can generally assert for any value 2, 3, 4,... of the number ν that
neither Aν nor any point situated between Aν−1 and Aν coincides with A0, nor with
A1, nor with a point situated between A0 and A1. The first part of this assertion,
expressing the possibility of that construction, follows from the axioms of equality (see
note 48); the second part can be proved from the axioms of order, as formulated by
Pasch and Hilbert.
33 Lobachevsky too presupposes the facts of congruence in his geometry. Apart
from that geometry, the facts of congruence also hold in another non-Euclidean ge-
ometry, which can be obtained when, besides abandoning the axiom of parallel lines,
one also modifies the axioms of order (note 32, cf. also note 41). According to the
philosophical perspective, the determinate facts of congruence are sometimes inserted
in certain—quite vaguely formulated—properties of space. For example, Lotze says
that the usual conception can only imagine space as homogeneous in its whole ex-
tension [Lotze 1884, 261]; to this regard, he uses the words: “On the contrary, space
itself, as an impartial arena that features all these events, cannot have local differ-
ences in its own nature, because they would prevent that everything that exists or
happens around one of its points, could be repeated without variation around any
other point.”
It is remarkable that Mill does not acknowledge in his analysis of Prop. 5 of
Book I of Euclid’s Elements ([Mill 1869, vol. 1, 242ff.]), that he himself used the
36 Otto Hölder
first theorem of congruence (Prop. 4 of the Book I by Euclid) in his presentation,
without substituting it with a deduction. However, this is concealed by the vague
way in which he expresses himself in this passage. He already used the principle that
equal line segments overlap in the widened sense that a pair of unequal line segments
must overlap with another pair of line segments that are respectively equal to the
former. Thereby, he obviously imagines a pair of line segments in motion, so rigidly
tied to each other that the included angle, which was initially identical to the angle
between the other line segments, remains equal during the motion. He is able to
draw his conclusion only because he assumes that the pair in motion overlaps the
other pair; here one has to be guided by some representations of the relative position,
and these representations used by Mill are fully equivalent to the application of the
theorem of congruence.
34 Strictly speaking, one needs, as Hilbert [Hilbert 1899, 12–14] has shown, to
assume as an axiom just a part of the assertion of the congruence’s theorem; the
remaining part can be proved afterwards. The second theorem of congruence, which
says that two triangles coincide in all their parts if they coincide in one side and two
angles, had already been proved—in the proper sense of the word—by Euclid: it is
Prop. 26 of Book I. Among the axioms of congruence Hilbert counts also some facts
that ground the addition of line segments and angles, and that are tacitly used in the
customary and most common way to carry out geometrical proofs (cf. note 48).
35 Sometimes one experiences—and the first algebra lesson, being often too for-
malistic, is partly responsible for this—that people readily operate with the rules of
the letter-calculus but encounter difficulties when they have to substitute numbers
in the formulas. In such a case, there is a lack of knowledge of the meaning of the
algebraic symbols. But, more generally, what is missing is an understanding of why
the algebraic transformations are legitimate. So, the general formulas on which the
transformations are grounded, such as a ·b = b ·a or a(b+c) = ab+ac, have a content
that is fundamentally non self-evident. These are theorems, the first of which says
that on the whole I obtain as many objects—let’s say, for example, spheres—when
I form a heaps of b spheres or vice versa b heaps of a spheres. Algebra consists in
the fact that we have such theorems, and use them to make inferences; the letters
thereby only provide an adequate denomination, and the form of the calculus given to
inferences has only the function of clarifying the overall view. Each formula and each
transformation of formulas can be expressed in words, and there is no fundamental
difference between tasks that, as they say, can be solved by ‘raisonnement’, and tasks
whose solution necessarily requires calculus.
One can thus designate the procedure of the letter-calculus as an inference process
that is ruled by formulas, such as ab = ba, a(b + c) = ab + ac used to derive infer-
ences. This is again an inference process that corresponds to the “Logic of relatives”
(note 25). If one considers those rules as axioms, then the analogy with geometry
is complete. Anyway, an essential difference with respect to geometry consists in
the fact that we can prove, inasmuch we go back from the algebraic formalism to
the number concept, that ab = ba, and precisely, we can prove it not simply by a
confirmation of the given formula by examples, as may have been the case when it
was originally discovered by induction, but by a deductive procedure (note 58).
36 [Peano 1888].
37 [Leibniz 1899, 570].
38 [Leibniz 1899, 575].
39 On this cf. [Baumann 1869, vol. 2, 56–63].
40 Cf. the above-mentioned Briefwechsel [Correspondence], [Leibniz 1899, 577].
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41 [Lobachevsky 1840, 13–17]. I think that among the axioms of Lobachevsky one
should also count the axioms of order (note 32), tacitly used by him in a similar form
to the one adopted by Hilbert [Hilbert 1899, 6–7]. One can then rigorously prove
that the sum of the angles of the triangle is not bigger than two right angles, and
that the angle mentioned in note 22 must be equal or smaller than two right angles.
42 Even in arithmetic, which is, in my opinion, purely deductive (see note 58),
the results are usually first found by induction. An example is provided by the
arithmetical theorem, according to which a prime number that is divided by 4 gives
a remainder of 1, can always be represented as the sum of two squares. This theorem
was found by Fermat, undoubtedly by induction, and afterwards first proved by Euler.
43 It roughly amounts to the same as saying that from the beginning geometry is
only concerned with relative ratios of magnitudes [Zindler 1889, 5]; for this claim could
only be justified by the preceding acquaintance with the phenomenon of similarity
which Euclid rightly deduces from the more simple facts of equality, congruence, etc.
In non-Euclidean geometry, there are no similar non-congruent figures; there is a
length proper to any of these geometries which takes a particular position in relation
to all other lengths, as the right angle does in Euclid in relation to all other angles.
44 Cf. Helmholtz’s remark on the intuitive knowledge of the typical behavior of
bodies, obtained in the observation of spatial relations [Helmholtz 1884, vol. 2, 30].
45 Book VI, Def. 1, propositions 4–7.
46 In Book V.
47 Euclid asserts all these axioms as applying to any kind of magnitudes (Book I).
From the point of view of geometry, the content of these axioms differs according to
the kind of magnitude taken into consideration; in the present paper I will restrict
myself to line segments.
The proof mentioned additionally requires the properties of the whole numbers
(which by the way can be deduced) as well as some commonly known axioms. This
is how the proof is set down: take a straight line g and two points A0 and A1 on g.
Now there is exactly one point A2 on g so that A1 lies between A0 and A2 and the
line segment A1A2 is equal to a given line segment; this fact has to be considered
as an axiom ([Hilbert 1899, 10]). We take A1A2 as being equal to A0A1 and then
assume a point A3 on g such that A2 lies between A1 and A3 and such that A2A3
is equal to A1A2 and thus—according to the former as well as to the known axiom
(note 14)—to A0A1. Moreover we choose A4 such that A3 lies between A2 and A4
and at the same time the line segment A3A4 is equal to the line segments A2A3,
A1A2, and A0A1. For our next step we choose A5 in the same manner and so on.
As a consequence of the axioms of order, e.g., not only does A2 lie between A1 and
A3—as it does according to the construction—, but also between A0 and A4 and
so on. Given that the line segments between any two consecutive points are equal,
we can conclude the equality of the line segments A0Am and AmA2, m being a
whole number, by virtue of the axiom which states that equals added to equals yield
equals (this axiom being asserted here only for the addition of line segments and
the latter being conceived purely geometrically as concatenation [Hilbert 1899, 11]).
Now it is possible—by virtue of the definition of the concatenation of line segments
and by virtue of the axioms of order—to conceive the line segment A0Anm, n and
m being whole numbers, both as the sum of the line segments A0Am, AmA2m,
A2mA3m and so on, and as the sum of the line segments A0A1, A1A2, A2A3, . . .
Anm−1Anm, from what follows that for the line segment A0A1, i.e., for any line
segment, the proposition holds that its nmth multiple is equal to the nth multiple
of its mth multiple.
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These considerations had to be stated before. If one takes now two given line
segments AB and A′B′—being respectively the mth and m′th multiple of the line
segment CD—it follows from what was said before that the m′th multiple of AB is
equal to mth multiple of A′B′; for the former is the m′mth, the latter the mm′th
multiple of CD, and we know that for numbers (see note 58) it holds that m′m =
mm′. Now if, at the same time, AB and A′B′ equal respectively the nth and the
n′th multiple of one and the same line segment EF , the n′th multiple of AB also
equals the nth multiple of A′B′. In the next step one has to show that using CD or
using EF in measuring AB and A′B′ yields the same numerical ratio, i.e., it has to
be shown that m
m′ =
n
n′ , viz. that mn
′ = nm′.
If one takes now the nm′th multiple of AB, this equals the nth multiple of the
m′th multiple of AB, i.e., it equals the nth multiple of the mth multiple of A′B′,
thus it is equal to the nmth multiple, i.e., to the mnth multiple of A′B′. This in turn
is the mth multiple of the nth multiple of A′B′, i.e., it is equal to the mth multiple
of the n′th multiple of AB, thus to the mn′th multiple of AB. We have now shown
that the nm′th multiple of AB equals the mn′th multiple of the same line segment.
From this follows that mn′ = nm′. The rigorous proof for that has to be set out
indirectly. If it were true e.g., that mn′ > nm′, one would take the (nm′ + 1)th and
the (nm′ + 2)th multiple of AB and so forth. The axiom that the greater added to
the greater yields the greater—which I hold to contain that adding something to the
greater or to the equal yields something greater than adding nothing to the smaller or
the the equal—permits us to conclude that the (nm′+1)th multiple, the (nm′+2)th
multiple and so forth and finally the mn′th multiple of AB would be greater than
the nm′th multiple of this line segment, which contradicts the result found above.
In this somewhat circumstantial proof it becomes clear that nowhere has any use
of the geometric intuition been made in an immediate way, but only in a mediate
way in implementing a couple of axioms which can be stated in a perfectly precise
manner.
48 In the case of line segments, the axioms of equality can be put in such a way
([Hilbert 1899, 10–11]) that from them together with the axioms of order follows the
fact concerning the addition of the greater to the greater. This of course presupposes
the reduction of the concept “greater” to the concepts “between” and “equal” by giving
the following definition: The line segment AB is greater than CD if there is on the
first line segment a point E between A and B such that AE equals CD.
The difficulty of such a proof for the untrained is that one has to put out of
one’s mind in an artificial way certain ideas which are taken for granted due to a
long process of familiarization. That it is nevertheless possible to unobjectionably
set down the proof might be shown by the following considerations.
The axioms concerning the equality of line segments posited by Hilbert can be
stated in the following way:
(1) The line segment AB always equals the line segment BA (to this axiom corre-
sponds the fact that if two rods, one having the ends A and B, the other A′ and
B′, can be superposed in such a way that A′ coincides with A and B′ with B, it
is also possible to superpose them inversely such that A′ coincides with B and
B′ with A).
(2) If the line segment AB equals the line segment A′B′, and if the latter equals the
line segment A′′B′′, it is also true that AB = A′′B′′ (see note 14).
(3) If A, B, and C are points on a straight line, and if A′, B′, and C′ also are points
on a straight line, and if furthermore B lies between A and C and B′ between
A′ and C′, it follows from AB = A′B′ and BC = B′C′ together that always
AC = A′C′ (axiom of the addition of equals to equals).
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(4) Given a point A on a straight line g and a second point B on the same line, and
furthermore somewhere a line segment CD; then there will be one and only one
point E with the twofold property that the line segment AE equals CD and that
E is placed on the same side of A as B (i.e., such that A does not lie between
B and E); moreover there is also one and only one point E′ with the twofold
property that AE′ = CD and that B and E′ are placed on different sides with
respect to A (i.e., such that A lies between B and E′).
Having given the definition of “greater”, I firstly note that the proposition AB >
(greater) CD, corresponding to the way we put it, excludes the proposition AB =
CD. Indeed according to the definition there is a point E between A and B (and,
thus, different from A and B) such that AE = CD. If it were true in addition that
AB = CD, it would follow from axiom (2) that also AE = AB; but since E and B
lie on the same side with regard to A, E and B must coincide according to axiom
(4), in contradiction to what we said before.
Next we suppose that A′B′ = AB and AB > CD and show that from this it
follows that A′B′ > CD. In order to do so we take the point E as before; in addition
we take a point E′ on the straight line g′ given by A′ and B′ (axiom (4)) such that
A′E′ = CD and such that E′ lies on the same side of A as B′. According to the
axioms of order E′ either lies between A′ and B′ or coincides with B′ or it takes
such a position that B′ lies between A′ and E′. It has to be proven that the first
case is true. Suppose that there is a second point B′′ on g′ such that E′B′′ = EB
and that E′ lies between A′ and B′′. Now from AE = CD = A′E′ (cf. axiom (2))
and from EB = E′B′′ follows that according to axiom (3) AB also equals A′B′′.
The points B′ and B′′ thus have the same properties; it holds that AB = A′B′, that
AB = A′B′′, and by virtue of the assumptions as well as the axioms of order both B′
and B′′ lie on the same side with regard to A′. Therefore B′ and B′′ must coincide
according to (4). Thus E′, being located between A′ and B′′, also lies between A′
and B′; according to the definition A′B′ therefore is greater than CD being equal to
the line segment A′E′.
If AB > CD, it follows from axiom (1) and from what was proved above that
BA > CD (this result states—put in an intuitive way—that, if the line segment CD
can be cut off from the line segment AB at its end A, this can also be done at its
end B; and from the preceding consideration it also follows that both ways of cutting
off yield an equal line segment).
Now one might assume that AB is greater than CD and that CD is greater than
FG; it is to be proved that also AB > FG. As a result of the assumptions just made
there is a point E between A and B with AE = CD. Given that also CD > FG,
and that according to what has already been proved AE > FG, there is a point H
between A and E with AH = FG. From the axioms of order now follows that H also
lies between A and B which, together with the last equation, means that AB > FG.
From this it results that, according to the way we put the concepts in this note,
the propositions AB > CD and CD > AB exclude each other; for from both taken
together would follow that AB > AB, whereas the concepts “greater” and “equal”
are incompatible (vide supra).
On the basis of these preliminaries the proof we are interested in can be set down.
The proof can immediately be reduced to the following arrangement. Given a point
B between A and C, a point B′ both between A and B and between A and C′; if
furthermore BC > B′C′, it is to be proved that C′ lies between A and C. From the
assumptions together with the axioms of order it follows that C′ and C are located on
the same side in regard to B′; hence C′ either lies between B′ and C, or it coincides
with C, or it is located in such a way that C lies between B′ and C′. In the second
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case, it follows from the arrangement of the points together with the definition of
the concept “greater” that B′C′ > BC (or, actually, first of all that C′B′ > CB),
which contradicts the original assumption that BC > B′C′. In the third case, the
same reasoning yields that both B′C′ > B′C and B′C > BC, for which reason
according to what has been proved before B′C′ > BC would hold, which again
contradicts the original assumption. The first case hence applies, i.e., C′ lies between
B′ and C and thus, according to the axioms of order, between A and C, which
was to be demonstrated.
For the sake of simplicity and clarity I restricted myself to line segments, the
axioms concerning the order of points being at our disposal in the proofs. Euclid
always asserts the relevant facts in a general manner for all magnitudes. The concept
of a magnitude or a quantum could indeed be conceived as given; in this case it would
be possible to show that, insofar as we postulate some of the facts commonly attached
to this concept, we can prove the remaining facts. This is what Mill aims to do and
what to some extent he indeed carries out [Mill 1869, 146, 147, note]. He is however
not aware of all the assumptions he actually makes use of; he thus assumes that
adding b to (a−b)+c yields a+c, i.e., he presupposes that (a−b)+c = (a+c)−b. It
only appears as if Mill only refers to numbers, and for numbers this assumption can
indeed be proved (see note 58). But if it is to be shown deductively that any objects
can be conceived numerically, i. e., that they are in numerical relations to each other,
certain facts have to be presupposed as axioms in order to deduce the other required
facts from them.
Considerations of this kind are also of importance as a preliminary for the mea-
surement of a physical state. They make it clear which experiments suffice to prove
that the physical state—e.g., the charge of an electrical body—can be conceived
quantitatively, cf. [Maxwell 1873, 35].
It is also helpful to note that we cannot speak of quantity properly in all cases
where we are aware of graduation. We can for example construct a hardness scale
by indicating whether two given bodies are equally hard and, in case they are not,
which of them is the harder one. Given three bodies we consequently are also able
to indicate which one lies between the two others, but we cannot say that one body
is twice as hard as a different one, or that two bodies taken together are as hard as
a third one. We thus cannot quantitatively conceive hardness.
49 If one adds the “axiom of continuity”, the Archimedean axiom can be proved on
the basis of the axioms of order and the axioms of equality. The proof can take the
following form. If all points located between A and B are distributed in any way on
two categories such that any point belongs to a determinate category, that there are
points in both categories, that furthermore, given a point X from the first category
and an point Y from the second, X always lies between A and Y , there is in any
case between A and B a point C such that between A and C there are only points of
the first category and between C and B there are only points of the second category.
The point C itself might belong to one category or the other, as the case might be
(cf. the different versions of this axiom in [Hilbert 1895, 92]).
The axiom of continuity provides a number of additional conclusions. If we divide
the points between A and B into two categories, e. g. by assigning a point X to the
first category if the double of AX is smaller than AB, and by assigning a point Y to
the second category if the double of AY is greater than or equal to AB, it is easy to
show that both categories bear the properties which are necessary for the application
of the axiom of continuity. This axiom then leads to the existence of a point C. The
assumption that the double of AC is smaller than AB can be reduced ad absurdum
by virtue of the propositions mentioned; the same holds for the assumption that the
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double of AC is greater than AB. From this it follows finally, that the double of AC
is exactly equal to AB.
It is thus proved that for a given line segment there is a second one which rep-
resents exactly half of the former. In the same way the existence of the third, the
quarter and so on can be proved, and thus a great many facts have been reduced to
a single axiom.
50 Beside the axioms of order of course the “axioms of concatenation” have to be
presupposed.
51 Book V, definition 5.
52 Both µ and ν are whole numbers and I reemphasize that the concept of multi-
plication of a line segment presupposes the concept of equality, but not the concept
of measure. E. g. AB equals the threefold of CD if there are two points M and N
between A and B such that M lies between A and N , N between M and B, and
AM = MN = NM = CD.
53 [Galilei 1638, Fifth Day, 22ff.]. The different facts admitted as immediately clear
by the people in the “Discorsi” imply the assumption of as many axioms.
54 [Hilbert 1899, 26ff.].
55 The measure of length established in such a way leads to assigning the positive
and negative numerical magnitudes to the points of a straight line, fixing arbitrarily
the points the numbers 0 and 1 are to correspond to. The so called “projective”
geometry leads to a different manner of distributing the positive and negative nu-
merical magnitudes to the points of a straight line, fixing arbitrarily the points three
determinate numbers are to correspond to. As one repeatedly concatenates equal
line segments in the treatment concerning length, so in this projective treatment an
operation has to be repeated several times, which is merely based on the connection
of points and the partition of straight lines, without ever equalizing two distances or
comparing them as to their equality. It is thus possible to establish a sort of measure
in geometry without making use of the concept of length or even of the the concept
of equality of line segments (cf. [Staudt 1857, 166ff.]; [Klein 1873, 112ff.]).
56 It was already remarked that Euclid proves too much when sometimes deriving
from evident facts other facts which are also said to be evident [Zindler 1889, 36ff.].
Because of the fact, however, that we can avoid intuition itself in the proper proof,
the attempt at deducing the whole geometry from a minimum of intuitive facts—or
empirical facts—assumed as axiomatic, gains the highest importance. All deductions
of this kind are of interest for the interrelation of knowledge—even in the case that
we are able to deduce both of two intuitive facts one from the other, using the axioms
which have been introduced anyway (in this case it is in fact an arbitrary decision
which of the intuitive facts should be added to the axioms).
In any case there will be quarrels about what self-evident means, while there is
normally no dissent in mathematics whether a given proof is stringent or not.
57 [Schur 1892, section 5, 5], [Killing 1898], [Hilbert 1899, 40ff.]. According to the
approach indicated in the text, we do not start with a definition of the content that
is common to equal figures, but with a definition of a procedure the result of which is
taken to be decisive in determining whether two figures (or bodies) can be said to be
“equal” or different. Since the definition chosen by us can be proved to be such that
two figures which are equal to a third one also have to be said to be equal to each
other, it holds that bringing together into one totality all figures equal to a given one
will provide a totality of figures equal to each other. This collective concept replaces
effectively the concept of content. This method is often applied in mathematics; in
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our case we can easily pass over to the definition of the measure of area, i.e., to the
proper concept of content.
The approach set out here can well be compared with Euclid’s theory of propor-
tions. As we did not define content, but merely declared under which conditions two
figures are to be said to be equal, so Euclid did not define the ratio of two line seg-
ments as a number, but merely indicated under which conditions two line segments
are to be said to be in the same ratio as two different line segments.
58 Arithmetical concepts can be used in deduction—also in geometrical deduction—
in a way that geometrical concepts are never used within deduction. The geometrical
concepts of point, line segment, angle, and so forth are handled in proofs in the purely
“formal” manner already explained in the text. We imagine a plurality of geometrical
elements bearing certain relative properties and can derive from this new relative
properties of the elements, operating not really with the geometrical concepts, but
only with the axioms relating them. If one has to prove a proposition concerning
a square or a hexagon, one will achieve this by repeating four times or six times
a certain thought operation. But if one has to prove a proposition concerning the
general n-sided polygon or the general polygon with an even number of sides, one has
to conceive a thought operation as repeated an indeterminate number of times. In
doing so general concepts have to be associated with the repetition of this thought
operation as well as with their order. These general concepts of a secondary kind
are number-concepts or combinatorical concepts, and in the proof these concepts are
used not only “formally”, but “contentually”.
The difference between the formal and the contentual use of concepts can be made
clear by comparing algebra—in the ordinary sense of the word—to arithmetics. In
showing e.g., that (a− b)(a2 + ab+ b2) = a3− b3, one operates merely with algebraic
symbols according to external rules comprising the rule that ab = ba. But if one
wants to prove that the content expressed by the formula ab = ba is true, one has to
take into account the nature of the concepts of number and multiplication. We have
to show that we are dealing with the same number of objects, e.g., spheres, whether
there are a collections of b spheres or b collections of a spheres. As is well known,
the proof goes like this: one begins with conceiving a collections of b spheres. Next
one takes away one sphere from each collection, which results in a collections of b− 1
spheres and, by bringing together the removed spheres, a new collection of a spheres.
Now once again one takes away one sphere from each of the a collections, what results
in a collections of b− 2 spheres and, together with the collection previously formed,
two collections of a spheres. By proceeding in such a manner finally all of the a
collections will be exhausted at the same time, and the spheres originally given are
now parted in b collections of a spheres.
We thus provided a proof of ab = ba in terms of rearranging spheres. It is difficult
to say on which ground we conceive the general possibility of this rearrangement;
one cause may be seen in the fact that we actually already carried out operations
of this kind.
As was noticed for the first time by Schröder ([Schröder 1873]) and as then was
stressed by Helmholtz ([Helmholtz 1895, 358]), the concept of the cardinal number
which the preceding consideration is based on presupposes a certain fact which I
nevertheless hold to be provable, cf. [Stolz 1885, 9, 10].
Helmholtz, following the example of H.Graßmann ([Graßmann 1860]), presented
a different proof of the propositions concerning numbers (cf. also [Kronecker 1887,
263ff.]). He makes use amongst others of the formula ab = (a − 1)b + b which he
considers to be an “axiom of arithmetics”. This axiom (of Graßmann) however is—
as Helmholtz himself put it in an analogous case (mentioned in the above quoted
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“Philosophische Aufsätze” ([Helmholtz 1887, 24] and [Helmholtz 1895, 363])—merely
a description of the procedure of multiplication. The formula can indeed be con-
ceived as the definition of multiplication, presupposing that the concept of addition
is known. For given the case that someone does not know what a times b is, we could
explain to him: 1 times b is b, 2 times b is 1 times b increased by b, 3 times b is 2
times b increased by b, and so forth; that is to say that in general a times b equals
(a− 1) times b increased by b, or, as a formula, ab = (a− 1)b+ b.
In the same manner any procedure that can be repeated indefinitely yields a
general concept as well as a rule for the application of this concept, the rightness of
which we understand together with the reality of the concept. For example, we are
able to multiply 1 by 2, the result by 3, the result obtained by 4, and so forth. The
result obtained in the multiplication by a will be designated by a!, and to this concept
applies the rule that a! equals (a − 1)! · a. Such rules may appear as axioms, since
they cannot be formally proved, but are immediately abstracted from the procedure
in question in order to form the basis of formal deductions. But it is in fact clear that
in arithmetic we would get an infinite number of axioms, because any procedure that
can be indefinitely continued yields such an axiom. For this reason I would not like
to call the formulas thus obtained axioms; but there is still another reason for this:
we frequently introduce into arithmetic a preceding or a combinatorical procedure
in order to find, with the help of the new concepts and rules yielded in such a way,
certain hidden properties of already known concepts or, insofar as these properties
have already been inductively found, to prove them. We can prove for instance the
theorem of arithmetics mentioned in note 42 by means of a procedure of “reduction” of
the so called “quadratic forms”. In arithmetic the abstraction of new general concepts
and rules thus forms in a way a constituent of deduction, and the procedure providing
the basis of abstraction is a process we do not count among experience in a narrower
sense of the word, that is to say in opposition to reasoning.
Having said this I want to assert that arithmetic—at least in so far as it concerns
whole and rational numbers (as regards rational numbers cf. [Stolz 1885, 25ff.] and a
review by the author in Göttinger gelehrte Anzeigen, [Hölder 1892, 592ff.] b)—has no
axioms in the proper sense, and that the arithmetical proof process is not a purely
formal process, but a mixed and extremely complex process.
59 The method of exhaustion, usually attributed to Archimedes, has already been
used by Euclid in the proof that two circular surfaces stand in the same ratio as the
squares of their radii (Book XII, no. 2).
60 The content of the circular surface can also be determined as follows. The
circle is said to be a regular polygon of an infinite number of infinitesimally small
sides which can be divided into an infinite number of infinitely narrow triangles; the
proposition in question follows from composition of these triangles, having the radius
as their height. Inferences of this type are called “method of infinity”.
The ideas involved in this method of infinity basically have to be considered as
auxiliary ideas used for the sake of brevity. Such considerations get a precise sense
when interpreted—as done in the text—in terms of the method of exhaustion (i.e.,
the method of inclusion in successively narrower limits). In this way strength is given
to these considerations, and it goes without saying that in mathematics the method of
infinity does not contain a new (transcendental) principle. Moreover, in the method
of infinity the indirect procedure only seems to be avoided.
61 There are a couple of mathematical proofs which have never successfully been
set down in a direct manner, and it might be possible to show that they can actually
b. Cf. Mircea Radu’s translation of this text in this volume, pp. 57–70
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only be set down as an indirect (apagogic) proof. The proof given in the text for
instance has been reached only by virtue of a theoretical twist rendering the proof
indirect. The concerns raised by some authors thus seem to me unjustified. The
indirect proof rests on the principle that the contrary of an assumption from which a
contradiction can be derived must be true. The principle is quite a useful version of
the principle of contradiction, whereas the so-called identity principle which is said
to comprise the principle of contradiction is definitely unfruitful.
62 I hold the Archimedean proof of the Law of the Lever to be among these proofs
in mechanics. In this regard I disagree with the remarks of Mach in [Mach 1883].
Mach advances the view that in Archimedes it is already presupposed that the effect
that a weight exerts on the lever depends on the product of the magnitudes of the
weight and the arm of the lever. This is not the case. Archimedes ([Archimedes 1881,
142]) indeed presupposes that there is no equilibrium in the case of equal weights and
unequal arms of the lever, and that an existing equilibrium will be disturbed when
one of the weights is increased; it is implied therein that the equilibrium depends on
the arm of lever on the one hand and on the weight itself on the other hand, but it
is not implied that an existing equilibrium is preserved in the case that for instance
one of the weights is triplicated and at the same time the fulcrum is shifted in such
a way that the arm of the lever is reduced to a third.
In addition to these precisely stated assumptions, Archimedes makes use of an-
other assumption. He assumes that the apparent use he makes of the center of gravity
amounts to nothing else—and this also seems to be Mach’s opinion—than that in an
arrangement of any number of weights two equal weights suspended at different points
can always be replaced by a single one of double weight which is suspended at the
mid-point between the points of suspension of the two weights. Archimedes addi-
tionally presupposes that the inverse substitution also is feasible. The assumption
can be thought of as being motivated on the one hand by the consideration that
equal weights at equal arms of the lever are in equilibrium and exert exactly the
same force on the point of suspension as these two weights would do if conjoined
below the point of suspension; and on the other hand by the assumption that the
observed equivalence also holds under different circumstances. The latter assumption
can again be reduced to the following one, that a system of forces acting on a rigid
body is in equilibrium, if a part of the forces considered separately is in equilibrium
and if the same also holds of the other part of the forces. This is a postulate (an
axiomatic assumption)—motivated, of course, by experience. This assumption can
be said to contain a wholly general idea of the fact that effects of forces can be com-
posed, and hence one may be led to the opinion that the assumption is equivalent to
the physical principle of “superposition” (on superposition, cf. [Volkmann 1894, 21]
and [Volkmann 1896, 69ff.]). An essential difference however consists in the fact that
the application of the principle of superposition presupposes a particular metrical law
according to which the effects of any two forces can be composed. The assumption
made here is easier.
Whatever one might think about Archimedes’ suppositions, it cannot be denied
that it is not possible to immediately, i.e., by means of the mere power of judgment,
perceive in them the Law of the Lever, though this metrical law necessarily follows
from these suppositions in a mathematical reasoning. Such proofs (deductions) are
always of value for the deeper knowledge of the scientific interrelation they provide;
this is true even if the result to be deduced has previously been found inductively—a
claim we cannot assert in the case of the Law of the Lever since the history of its
discovery is unknown to us. In any case, in order to immediately establish in an
inductive way the Law of the Lever, numerous and more precise measurements would
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have to precede, whereas already the experiences of every day life might lead us to
postulate the Archimedean assumptions, which recommends these assumptions as
the simpler foundations.
These foundations nevertheless are inductive; but this fact does not prevent us
from using them deductively, indeed just as we also use empirical laws of nature
deductively. The real method of mathematical physics consists of a conjunction of
the inductive and the deductive procedure (cf. [Wundt 1883, 66]).
63 Cf. Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica [Newton 1687].
64 It is of utmost interest that the mechanical concepts, though they are widely
considered as extracted from experience, show in their scientific use the same ideal
perfection as geometrical concepts. As regards the latter, the circumstance in question
was exploited for the benefit of a philosophical theory, in particular for the benefit of
Kant’s conception of space. It is usually said, then, that the empirical objects never
perfectly represent the geometrical concepts, for in experience there are merely little
bodies instead of points, whereas the concepts and propositions of geometry are held
to be exactly valid for the perfect laws of the intuition proper to us and thus basically
apply to intuition rather than to experience.
In this regard I have to object that I cannot credit intuition neither with perfec-
tion nor with exact correspondence to geometry insofar as this intuition is not merely
postulated, but is actually to be observed in us. In fact we are only acquainted with
the faculty of our imagination, to represent images of spatial objects with a vividness
close to that of actually seeing these objects. On the contrary, I cannot pretend to be
able to imagine two completely equal line segments. I am however completely able to
picture two approximately equal images of line segments and, by doing so, to decide
that I will consider them as equal, i. e., I am able to conceive them as equal. Nor I
could pretend to imagine with sensual vividness a straight line as infinitely extended.
I rather imagine a limited straight line augmented by a segment, and the thought
that the same segment can be added to the straight line again and again makes me
conceiving of it as infinite. Similarly in mechanics the thought of a “material point”
results from the idea of a body whose mass is taken into consideration whereas its
extension is so little or can be made so little by compression that it is no longer taken
into consideration.
As the mechanical concepts are thus abstractions on the basis of experience, so
also the geometrical concepts are likely to have resulted from abstraction—be it from
experience or from intuition—, and geometrical and mechanical concepts thus hardly
differ from ordinary empirical concepts.
But there is more. After having found, by virtue of experience, laws which interre-
late the geometrical concepts, these laws fuse in our consciousness with the concepts,
and from this results the will to retain these laws given any future experiences; this
however will also affect the particular application of the concepts. In mechanics, this
is indeed the case. It has already often been remarked and has often been objected
against an empirical origin of geometry that we usually correct experience by geom-
etry, not the other way round. It is true that we often do so. If we put a ruler on the
table and if the ruler does not fit the table in all directions, we will conclude from
this that the table is not perfectly plane, but not that the propositions applying to
straight lines and planes are incorrect. I nevertheless think that this point does not
refute the empirical origin of geometry. In mechanics we act precisely in this way;
if, e. g., a comet shows an inexplicable deceleration of its motion, we assume for the
sake of the law of inertia that the space is filled with a resisting medium.
We can understand this point as follows: the primitive concepts of geometry
and mechanics as well as the simplest concepts of this science are abstracted ac-
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cording to experience, in the case of geometry probably according to quite raw ex-
periences. Only after the laws, obtained by experience, proved to be true on the
whole and to be useful in application, one attempted to postulate them as exactly
valid for points and straight lines, for masses that are perfect points, for perfectly
constant forces and so forth. With these postulates we thus ascend to unlimited
precision (cf. [Volkmann 1894, 17]).
The interrelated concepts of the geometric elements—point, straight line and so
forth—together with the relations which can hold between these elements (e.g., a
point can lie on a straight line) and the laws (axioms) postulated by us and per-
mitting us to conclude the existence of certain relations from the existence of other
relations, amount to a completely elaborated conceptual image of the real and appar-
ent order of things which is called “space” (this concept of space is a concept of higher
order which shows a logical structure and permits us to draw conclusions from, cf.
[Volkelt 1886, 384]). But since we are able, as we have seen, to develop from different
assumptions different coherent geometric systems, the concept of space can also be
formulated in different ways. I think that the earlier philosophers who concerned
themselves with the essence of space in geometry all had in mind the Euclidean con-
cept of space, and their theories differ only in how they thought about the relation
between this concept and reality. It is comprehensible that some wanted to credit
such a consequential concept with a higher truth in regards to reality, whereas Kant
considered it as subjective, assuming this concept to be identical with intuition and
this “pure” intuition to be the form that things have to appear in because of our
mental organization.
If one takes into consideration that we have a similarly consequential concept of
the motions of a body and of the play of forces governing this motion, which proba-
bly rests on experience, one will be apt to believe that also the concept of space has
been formed with the help of experience. It will no longer appear contradictory that,
though we use this concept in some cases in order to interpret experience, we neverthe-
less consider it possible to check this concept—whose adequacy is hypothetical—for
correspondence with experience in order to reshape the concept, if necessary, as we
do with physical concepts (in the domain of physical knowledge we admittedly form
concepts by the way of trial and error, reshaping them in the case of non-confirmation,
cf. [Sigwart 1893, 242]). The lack of exactness which, in regard to geometry, inheres
in empirical objects, does not necessarily obstruct verification. Euclid’s geometry
allows us to draw conclusions for extended bodies, i.e., also for points that are not
exactly points, straight lines that are not exactly straight lines, and so forth, for
which reason we can verify whether experiences obtained with such imprecise objects
agree, within accuracy limits, with conclusions from the axioms. The same holds for
the mechanical postulates which we check only in a mediate way.
Until now there was accordance between Euclidean geometry and experience;
this geometry has been verified in innumerable cases, since practically any empir-
ical application of this geometry is such a verification. At least as regards appli-
cation, there is no reason to deviate from Euclid’s geometry. Riemann presumes
that possibly in the future new facts will be found which will determine such a de-
viation, and already Lobachevsky held that astronomical measurements might give
reasons for this.
Such assertions have provoked rejection in philosophy (cf. [Lotze 1884, 248];
[Sigwart 1893, 82]). There is no doubt that a contradiction in astronomical mea-
surements and calculations might be interpreted in quite different ways. We could
assume that the light ray which falls in the observer’s telescope is not completely
straight; for even if we originally abstracted the concept of the straight line from
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the line of vision, it is still possible to subsequently relate the concept of the exactly
straight line to the Euclidean axioms and then to distinguish between the straight
line and the line of vision. But, since the astronomical measurement in question must
be made at different moments and since the celestial bodies meanwhile have moved,
the error might also be corrected by assuming different laws for the motion of the
celestial bodies. In order to take into consideration in our hypothetical case all pos-
sibilities, the whole system of physico-geometrical concepts, insofar as it is relevant
for astronomy, must be reorganized (the work of Lipschitz, who developed a mechan-
ical theory for non-Euclidean geometry, can be regarded from this point of view, cf.
[Lipschitz 1872, 116]). It is surely extremely improbable that geometry would finally
be the object of this reorganization—but it is nonetheless not impossible.
65 The sensation which makes us declare something as evident seems in my opinion
to rest on this.
66 The fact that it is impossible to define properly, i.e., constructively, the primitive
concepts of mechanics has also resulted in the complete abandoning of any definition
of these concepts, e.g., in [Kirchhoff 1877]. At the same time Kirchhoff declared the
problem of mechanics to consist in a complete and most simple description of motions
in nature. The descriptions he has in mind are effectuated in terms of equations; he
considered the magnitudes of the forces and masses to be nothing else than numerical
coefficients figuring in these equations [Kirchhoff 1877, 5, 12]. This conception does
not do justice to the physical content of the concepts and within this conception
it seems inexplicable why those numerical coefficients, which are called masses, are
independent from time. Kirchhoff’s claim that mechanics merely describes has been
repeated too often. In a certain sense explaining of course amounts to describing, but
nonetheless it fundamentally differs from a purely external description, and we should
thus retain the distinguishing term. Paul Du Bois-Reymond says : “The derivation
of a manifold phenomenic domain from the simplest elements of appearance is no
description. I think it is better called the synthesis, the construction or the build-up
of the phenomenic domain from simplest mechanisms” [du Bois-Reymond 1890, 14].
67 As has already been remarked, the similarity between geometrical and mechan-
ical concepts as well as between geometrical and mechanical deduction provides evi-
dence for the empirical origin of geometry, unless certain concepts of mechanics also
are considered as “a prioric”, i.e., as independent from experience. This seems to be
the case in Kant where he speaks of “pure” science. For example, the persistence of
substance he counts among “the pure and completely a priori laws of nature” ([Kant
1781-1787, Pt. II, Div. I, Bk. II, Ch. II, 3., A, 301]). What should be understood, ac-
cording to Kant, by persistence of substance becomes evident from the example given
by him in the passage in question: “A philosopher was asked: How much does the
smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was
burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.
He thus assumed as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never
disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form” [Kant 1781-1787, 302].
Kant hence wants the precise law of the conservation of matter to be included in the
principle of persistence. He however had a different opinion about different mechani-
cal concepts, e.g., when he considers motion to be an empirical concept (Doctrine of
Elements, Pt. I, Div. I, Bk. I, Ch. III, 3., [Kant 1781-1787]).
In addition to this similarity, an immediate interrelation between geometrical
and mechanical concepts can be found. Helmholtz indeed assumes (annotation 14)
that the geometrical concept of congruence presupposes a physical concept, e.g., the
concept of the rigid body; and Benno Erdmann considers this in his Axiome der
Geometrie ([Erdmann 1877, 91, 147, 148]) as a proof of the empirical view.
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68 On “experience as a verification of correctness of knowledge”, cf. [Volkelt 1886,
256].
69 In both sciences it becomes evident that a collection and examination of empir-
ical facts has to come first in order to inductively find the laws which make possible
deduction in the particular parts of the science. This becomes evident because still
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